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Salary Compression Among University Faculty:
A Review and Case Study of Remediation and Prevention in a
Collective Bargaining Environment1
Brent M. Graves2 and Dale Kapla3
Literature Review
The Problem
Becker’s (1975) theory of specific human capital suggests that experience provides workers
with knowledge and skills that are valuable to employers, so workers with greater seniority are
worth more. Furthermore, current effort and performance may be encouraged by the promise of
higher wages in the future (Lazear,1981). There are a variety of economic models that draw
similar conclusions, such that it is widely accepted that wages should rise with seniority (Topel,
1991). Some have suggested that this is not true for university faculty because faculty are
attracted by non-monetary forms of compensation, leading to meager pay increases with
seniority and resistance to pay differentials based on productivity or discipline (Bowen and
Schuster, 1986; p 248-9; Hearn, 1999; Clark, 1987).
However, a considerable positive correlation between seniority and pay among university
faculty in most fields is generally well established (Barbezat, 2003). Work from the 1970’s found
professional experience to be the most powerful factor in predicting salaries (Braskamp et al.,
1978; Hamovitch & Morgenstern, 1975). Across the 1980s, pay for professors was about twothirds higher than that of assistant professors (Bowen & Schuster, 1986; Scott & Bereman, 1992)
and salary ratios across ranks remained steady through the mid-1990s (Hearn, 1999). Given the
average years on the job between these ranks, such pay increases as a result of seniority in
1

This article formed the basis of portions of a panel discussion at the Annual Conference of the National Center for
the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, New York City, 2018. Terrance
Seethoff negotiated the 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012 contracts for Administration and developed many of the
strategies to address salary compression. Linda Hares wrote table notes for Administration during the, 2006, 2009,
2012, and 2015 contract negotiations, then searched and compiled relevant parts for our case study. Provost and
Vice President for Academic Affairs Kerri Schuiling and the NMU-AAUP chapter provided reassigned time for
BMG to work on this project.
2

Brent Graves is Professor of Biology and President of the Northern Michigan University Chapter of the American
Association of University Professors, bgraves@nmu.edu.
3

Dale Kapla is Associate Provost, Northern Michigan University; dkapla@nmu.edu.

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
ISSN 1941-8043
Vol. 10, December, 2018
© 2018 National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
Published by The Keep, 2018

1

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

academia are probably similar to those of United States workers in general, where ten years of
seniority is worth about 25% in additional pay (Topel, 1991).
Variation in faculty salaries may also result from disciplinary differences, and these began
to grow in the 1980s as a result of an imbalance of supply and demand for faculty in certain
fields. As salaries rose in high demand areas, budgets were balanced by restraining salaries for
low demand areas. Thus, while the differences between average salaries at junior and senior
ranks were constant from 1971 to 1987, the coefficient of variation increased (Hammermesh,
1988). High-paid fields became higher and low-paid fields became lower. Scott and Bereman
(1992) found a similar pattern at land grant institutions; much larger salary increases in business,
computer science, and engineering than in education, fine arts, foreign languages, and letters.
This pattern continued into the 1990s, with business, law, medicine, and engineering faculty
rising faster than those in education, liberal arts, languages, and literatures (Hearn, 1999). The
factors that influenced average faculty salaries across disciplines also affected salaries within
disciplines.
Competition for faculty in certain fields can result in relatively higher salaries for new
hires. Funding for new faculty salaries may be obtained by limiting inflationary and promotion
increases for current faculty. This reduces the effect of seniority on salary, resulting in a situation
termed “salary compression” (e.g., Kassem, 1971). In extreme cases, the salaries of those with
less seniority are greater than those with more, resulting in a pattern that has been termed “salary
inversion” (Jennings & McLaughlin, 1997). We will refer to both patterns generically as “salary
compression.” The first peer-reviewed journal article to examine this pattern in academia was
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin in 1987, although it was apparently already widely recognized and
discussed. They state that “One can scarcely attend a professional meeting where this topic does
not come up.” Blum (1989) suggested that salary compression became an issue in academia only
in the 1980s. Many institutions have worked to identify and rectify salary compression, and this
has produced an extensive literature on the topic. Regardless, it continues to be an issue
(McDonald & Sorenson, 2017; Rees, 2017).
Does salary compression exist in academia? The answer depends on many factors and
various studies have produced sometimes conflicting results. Some researchers have found an
absence of salary compression (Barbezat & Donihue, 1998; Barbezat, 2004a, 2004b;
Toutkoushian, 1998; Seaman, 2005, 2007a; Yeh & Wang, 2012). Furthermore, there may be
significant variation across disciplines and time (Bereman & Lengnick-Hall, 1994; McDonald &
Sorenson, 2017; Seaman, 2007b). Compression seems to be most prominent in a few rapidly
growing fields, especially business (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1987; Hammermesh, 1988; Scott &
Bereman, 1992; Snyder et al., 1992; Bereman & Lengnick-Hall, 1994; Webster, 1995; Barbezat,
2004a; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Toutkoushian, 1998; Bai et al., 2011; Murawski & King,
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol10/iss1/3
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1741

2

Graves and Kapla: Salary Compression Review and Case Study

2011; Arnold et al., 2012; McDonald & Sorenson, 2017). Bratsberg et al. (2003) found strong
salary compression among economics faculty after accounting for research, service and the fit of
faculty to the university. Barbezat (2003) provides an excellent review of various factors that
may be confounded with seniority, creating the appearance of salary compression or inversion
where none exists.
Methods for Detecting Salary Compression
Salary equity studies became widespread as a result of The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act and the Equal Pay Act, both in 1972 (Barbezat, 2002). Seniority was often used as a factor in
these salary models, leading to the detection of salary compression and inversion (Gordon et al.,
1974; Hoffman, 1976; McCulley & Downey, 1993; Barbezat, 2004a). Barbezat (2003) provides
an excellent review of efforts to detect salary compression through about 2001. There have been
two primary approaches to identifying salary compression: comparison of ratios of salaries at
various ranks and multiple regression (Seaman, 2005). A few other techniques for identifying
salary compression have seen limited use. These include stochastic dominance (Arnold et al.,
2012; McDonald & Sorenson, 2017), multiple objective programming (Sun, 2002) and
calculation of a coefficient of inversion (Jennings & McLaughlin, 1997).
Earlier studies of academic salary compression tended to rely on salary ratios (GomezMejia & Balkin, 1987; Barbezat, 2004a). National level data sets often lacked the detail
necessary for regression analysis, and so were commonly analyzed by determining the ratios of
salaries at various ranks or relative to some other benchmark (e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, 1988;
Bereman & Lengnick, 1994; Midha et al., 2004; Seaman, 2005). Comparisons can be made both
within and between institutions (Dworkin, 1990; Snyder et al., 1992). The problem with ratio
data is that there is often no reference for how much difference between average salaries is
appropriate (Toutkoushian, 1998). If a time series of data is available, narrowing of the gaps
between average wages at various ranks can indicate salary compression (e.g., Hammermesh,
1988; Scott & Bereman, 1992; Seaman, 2007b; Arnold et al., 2012; June, 2014; McDonald &
Sorenson, 2017). A significant problem with this approach is that it ignores many confounding
variables. These problems led to more widespread use of regression analysis.
Regression analysis allows removal of salary variation due to a number of factors (e.g.,
highest degree, previous experience, administrative assignments, unionization, mobility, tenure,
productivity, etc.) in order to isolate better the effects of seniority on salary. One of the earliest
and best studies to identify salary compression used regression on national level data (Ransom,
1993). However, many national level data sets lacked detail, so regression analyses were
commonly based on data from one or a few institutions (e.g., McCulley & Downey, 1993;
Hallock, 1995; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Moore et al., 1998). More detailed national data sets
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that became available in the late 1980s made regression analysis more feasible (e.g., Barbezat &
Donihue, 1998). A significant methodological improvement in the analysis of salary
compression was presented by Toutkoushian (1998) who developed a five-step process for
identifying salary compression, as well as the extent to which each faculty member’s salary
differed from the expected salary in the absence of compression. Some regression analyses have
found evidence of salary compression after controlling for confounding factors (Twigg et al.,
2002; Bratsberg et al., 2003; Yeh & Wang, 2012; Allen et al., 2015), while others have not
(Toutkoushian, 1998; Barbezat, 2004b; Monks & Robinson, 2001; Seaman, 2007a). Sometimes,
compression is found for certain disciplines, tenure statuses, or career stage, but not for others
(Barbezat & Donihue, 1998; Barbezat, 2004a). Only a few studies have considered the effects of
gender on salary compression (Hoffman, 1976; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Burke et al., 2005).
Causes of Salary Compression
Early examination of salary compression in nonacademic fields blamed the phenomenon on
inflation, which drove up the salaries necessary to hire new employees. Lack of funds prevented
comparable salary increases, plus increases for seniority, for ongoing employees (Kassem,
1971). Although faculty salaries are clearly affected by inflation (Scott & Bereman, 1992), salary
compression in academia is generally thought to be a result of low supply and high demand for
faculty in certain disciplines, and the lack of funds to raise senior faculty salaries in a
commensurate manner (McCulley & Downey, 1993; Burgan, 2005; Burke et al., 2005; Seaman,
2007a).
In contrast, some authors have suggested that salary compression is normal and may not be
a problem (e.g., Bereman & Lengnick-Hall, 1994). Economists separate human capital (what
makes an employee valuable) that is accumulated with experience into general (not specific to an
employer) and specific (valuable only to the current employer) (Becker, 1975). Faculty skills
tend to be of the former type, allowing faculty to easily move between universities. If faculty can
obtain higher salaries by moving to a different university, then it is likely that the best faculty
will move, while low performers will stay (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1987). As a result, low
performers with low pay will have high seniority and higher performers with high pay will have
low seniority, especially in disciplines with a shortage of faculty (Ransom, 1993; Brown &
Woodbury, 1998; Monks & Robinson, 2001).
It is thought that university faculty are in a unique situation with regard to economic factors
affecting salaries. Tenure and the distance between academic institutions make it especially
costly for faculty to change employers. Thus, administrations have less need to increase pay with
seniority in order to retain faculty. This has been termed “monopsony power” (Ransom, 1993;
Barbezat & Donihue, 1998; Brown & Woodbury, 1998; Siow, 1998). Hallock (1995) argued
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against monopsony effects on faculty salaries. He suggested that findings from his study may
have reflected collective bargaining that institutionalized salary dispersion, as well as an urban
environment that made it relatively easy to change universities. Faculty who stay at relatively
low pay may have little incentive to maintain high productivity, thus creating justification for the
low pay (Moore et al., 1998; Barbezat, 2003). However, Ransom (1993) found that productivity
did not decrease with seniority.
Salary compression may be greater at research universities (Ransom, 1993; Brown &
Woodbury, 1998; Glandon & Glandon, 2001; Allen et al., 2015), although another study found
more compression in mid-sized universities (Hoffman, 1997). Unionization may decrease
compression (Barbezat, 1989; Hallock, 1995; Hoffman, 1997), although another study found no
effect of union representation on salary compression (Martinello, 2009). It is even possible that
higher-ranked faculty tend to have higher salaries with collective bargaining than without,
because collective bargaining agreements are almost invariably negotiated by senior faculty.
Effects of Salary Compression
Salary compression is not necessarily a problem (Snyder et al., 1992). But in general, there
is concern about salary compression because of its potential for negative effects on individual,
and hence institutional, effectiveness. Almost all authors have cited low morale, and
consequently poor performance, as results of salary compression (Kassem, 1971; Gomez-Mejia
& Balkin, 1987; Blum, 1989; Scott & Bereman, 1992; Snyder et al., 1992; Jennings &
McLaughlin, 1997; Seaman, 2007a). Glassman and McAfee (2005) argue that such salary
inequities are unethical, with resulting negative effects on university culture. Alternatively, some
have argued that flat salary structures promote collegiality, cooperation, and commitment
(Lazear, 1981). There is an extensive literature regarding these contrasting perspectives in the
context of corporations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014), but they have rarely been examined
empirically in academia. However, Pfeffer and Langton (1988) found that compressed salaries in
academic departments were associated with more social and democratic interactions. The same
authors in a later study (1993) found that salary compression was positively correlated with
productivity, satisfaction, and collaboration among faculty.
When salaries of new hires are higher than those of more senior employees, there is
incentive for employees to move to a new employer (Amey & VanDerLinden, 2002; Seaman,
2007a). The cost of remaining with an employer has been termed a “loyalty tax” (Blum, 1989;
Barbezat, 2004a). Resulting turnover is detrimental due to loss of human capital, hiring costs,
and training costs for new employees. It is interesting that this hypothesis has received little
empirical attention. One study concluded that salary compression has decreased faculty retention
in pharmacy (Murawski & King, 2011). Another found no correlation in business schools
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(Glandon & Glandon, 2001) and a third found that greater pay dispersion among college
administrators led to higher turnover of lower paid individuals (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992).
Employees who are dissatisfied with salary structures may find an alternative remedy in the
courts. More senior employees are generally of greater chronological age, providing an
opportunity to challenge salary inversion on the basis of age discrimination. These have not been
successful (Mooney, 1991; O’Boyle, 2001; Euben, 2003).
Responses to Salary Compression
Once a university has determined that salary compression exists, it must decide what to do
about it. Some argue that salary compression is not a problem and may simply reflect the value
of faculty at various levels of seniority with regard to productivity (Moore et al., 1998; Barbezat,
2004a) or market forces (Euben, 2003), or that flat salary structures promote cooperation and
productivity (Bowen & Shuster, 1986; Pfeffer & Langton, 1988, 1993; Lazear, 1981). Still, there
is widespread agreement that salaries should rise with seniority (Becker, 1975; Topel, 1991), so
it is common for institutions to attempt to restore this correlation. The problem has been
recognized in academia for decades, and it does not seem to be going away (Boggs, 2015;
Flaherty, 2016; McDonald & Sorenson, 2017; Rees, 2017). As stated in the seminal work by
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1987) “Identifying pay compression, its causes, and its effects is a far
simpler task than devising ways in which universities, or other employers, can deal with the
problems that such a condition creates.” Consequently, the literature on the latter is far less
extensive than the former.
A number of strategies have been suggested to prevent salary compression from occurring.
Lillydahl and Singell (1992) note that, while salaries are often positively correlated with research
productivity, teaching quality is not similarly rewarded. They suggest that if it were, late-career
faculty who concentrate more on teaching than research might not have compressed salaries.
Although we have not found this suggestion in the literature, it is possible that greater value
might be placed on service. It is possible that senior faculty are more valuable, not because they
produce more scholarship, but for the same reason that administrators are more valuable; they
have knowledge and experience that allows them to wisely contribute to shared governance of
the university. If this were recognized in performance evaluations, then merit raises might
alleviate salary compression. It may be possible to balance lower salaries of senior faculty with
non-monetary compensation. These might include first pick of paid tasks such as consulting or
additional teaching assignments, better offices, and more convenient schedules (Gomez-Mejia &
Balkin, 1987; Glassman & McAfee, 2005). Snyder et al. (1992) surveyed provosts who
suggested increasing raises associated with promotions, setting salary minimums, and promoting
more rapidly.
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Universities also commonly attempt to correct for salary compression by identifying
individual faculty with unjustifiably low salaries, followed by calculation of the salary increase
required to rectify the problem. There are difficulties with this post-hoc approach. One must find
the necessary money, and lack of funds was probably the primary cause of the problem in the
first place. Further, it is a temporary solution that must be repeated frequently if future salary
compression is to be prevented.
Most often, factors such as merit, rank, time in rank, longevity at the institution, and market
conditions for each discipline are used to build a multiple regression model to predict salaries,
and negative residuals are used as indicators of the degree to which individual salaries should be
raised (Huseman et al., 1996). At Indiana State University, residuals from a multiple regression
analysis were used to flag low paid faculty, who then argued their case for raises to departmental
personnel committees (Lamb & Moates, 1999). Duncan et al. (2004) avoided penalizing highperforming faculty for having high salaries by removing the effects of earlier merit raises before
addressing equity. Similarly, Herzog (2008) developed a four-step process to address
discrimination prior to equity and merit. Jennings and McLaughlin (1997) found that, out of five
models for calculating salary compression corrections, none decreased compression best for all
departments, or for various funding levels within departments.
Methods other than regression are also used to calculate salary adjustments that correct
compression. Rather than regression analysis, Stewart et al. (1996) used standard salary
predictors to build a salary goal table for each rank and discipline. Richardson and Thomas
(2013) recommended using an “equity-performance matrix” to merge compression and
performance influences on salary adjustments. The University of Wisconsin Oshkosh combined
productivity increases for full professors with internal equity adjustments based on regression
and larger promotion salary raises (Flaherty, 2013). Although they note that differential salary
increases are viewed with skepticism by most faculty union members, Blitz and Cross (2013)
recommended balancing equity and market forces through the collective bargaining process.
They reviewed collective bargaining agreements and describe how Eastern Illinois University
avoided salary compression by changing promotion raises from a consistent dollar amount (a
smaller percentage of higher salaries) to a consistent percent of base salary.
Case Study
It is widely accepted that salary compression in higher education results from competition
for high-demand/low-supply faculty in certain disciplines. In order for a university to hire such
individuals, they are offered high salaries, often higher than their more senior colleagues. This is
compounded when cost of living and promotion raises are minimized in order to budget for high
salaries of new hires (McCulley & Downey, 1993; Burgan, 2005; Burke et al., 2005; Seaman,
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2007a). The causes of salary compression at Northern Michigan University (NMU) were quite
different and previously undescribed in the literature. The solution, which is also unique, has
been gradually devised across five contracts, and has resulted in both correction and prevention
of salary compression. Contract negotiation was done by four-member teams. The faculty
negotiation team received direction from a Contract Proposal Development Team that surveyed
the faculty for important issues, as well as a Faculty Council that met with the negotiation team
frequently to review proposals and progress. The negotiation team, however, had significant
freedom to negotiate a tentative agreement, which ultimately required ratification by the
bargaining unit prior to implementation. Similarly, the administration formed their own proposal
team consisting of the associate provost, deans of colleges, several department heads and the
provost. Several ideas and approaches are normally winnowed to just a few larger, more
comprehensive proposals. Again, similar to the faculty negotiation team, the administration’s
team normally consisted of four individuals with significant negotiation authority.
Demographics
NMU is an upper-Midwest public comprehensive university with an enrollment of roughly
7,000 students. Its faculty are represented by two unions: the NMU Chapter of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the Northern Michigan University Faculty
Association (NMUFA) affiliated with the Michigan Association of Higher Education, Michigan
Education Association, National Education Association. The former is the largest, with both
part-time and full-time faculty numbering close to 400, while the latter represents around 20 fulltime only faculty. Thus, the AAUP faculty were chosen for this analysis, as its membership
comprises about 90% of teaching faculty representing most of the academic programs in the
university.
Overview of the Problem
Serious discussion of salary compression at NMU was initiated during contract
negotiations between NMU administration and AAUP in 2003. Although, some authors have
suggested establishment of salary minimums and salary increases for promotion as a remedy for
salary compression (Snyder et al., 1992), these were the primary causes of compression at NMU.
Negotiation notes from 2003 indicate that it was already clear that salary increases associated
with promotion were only about one-quarter of the dollar gap between minimum salaries for all
ranks. Consequently, even when faculty were hired well above the minimum for a rank, they
almost always were increased to the minimum salary at the next rank. Additionally, for almost
two decades, promotion amounts and salary minimums tended to increase each year at a percent
value equal to the across-the-board (ATB) cost-of-living salary adjustment. Thus, even after
promotion, salary minimums for each rank increased at the same rate as salaries of faculty
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already in that rank, resulting in most faculty salaries falling within a narrow range near the rank
minimum. The following is a summary of discussions and solutions resulting from
labor/management contract negotiations that occurred at three-year intervals from 2003 through
2015.
The Beginning - 2003
In the 2003 contract negotiation, AAUP proposed to address this problem by setting
minimums for full professors that increased with seniority. In contrast, administration proposed
that rank minimums should be held relatively constant, while across-the-board (ATB) increases
moved more-senior faculty above the minimums. Either approach would alleviate compression,
but the former would be more costly than the latter. No resolution or action was agreed upon, but
language was inserted into the contract that required formation of a joint faculty/administration
committee to study market factors, salary compression, and faculty compensation in the
subsequent academic year, with the stipulation that the committee’s recommendations would be
given serious consideration in the next contract negotiation.
The salary compression committee’s final report was submitted May 24, 2005. They
affirmed salary compression for associate and full professors based on a subjective identification
of the narrow range of most salaries for each rank that were clustered around the minimum,
regardless of seniority. Four systemic causes of compression were identified. First, while merit,
equity, and enrollment incentives in addition to ATB salary increases had created some variation
in salaries, these had not occurred for over a decade. Salary dispersion was then lost as faculty
who had received such increases in the 1980s and 1990s retired. Second, contracts in the 1970s
had specified salaries based on years in rank, as well as rank, but these were abandoned in favor
of minimum salaries for ranks alone. From 1985 on, minimum salaries increased at the same
percentages as ATB. Third, the impact of large differences between minimum salaries for faculty
ranks (as explained in the previous paragraph) usually brought faculty to the same minimum
level after promotion. Fourth, although market factors influenced initial salaries, promotion
tended to erase these and there was no recurring market review that would maintain such
differences. The committee recommended adjustments to salaries based on merit, seniority, and
market to remedy compression. However, they noted that this would require acceptance from the
bargaining unit of unequal raises, and that these would all be short-term solutions. They provided
a number of long-term solutions that all revolved around differential increases to rank
minimums, ATBs, and promotion amounts.
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CUPA and Inversions - 2006
During negotiation of the 2006 contract, administration proposed several interconnected
strategies to address salary compression that were ultimately accepted. First, in addition to ATB
increases, a market and seniority adjustment totaling 3.1% of total faculty salaries was
distributed. Faculty received the highest of (a) the College and University Professional
Association for Human Resources (CUPA-HR, or simply CUPA) disciplinary average, (b) rank
minimum plus 0.6% for each year in rank (up to 6 years for assistant and associate professors
and, 20 years for full professors), or (c) the individual’s previous year salary times 1.015.
Although discipline-based variation in faculty salaries had existed for some time as a result of
initial salary at the time of hire, the use of CUPA data was an explicit acknowledgement of
market influences on salary. While not always popular in a collective bargaining environment,
this was approved by the faculty via the contract ratification vote. Second, ATBs went up faster
than rank minimums. A third strategy to combat salary compression was a large increase in
promotion raises (almost five times the previous amount on average) that varied with an
individual’s pre-promotion salary (a flat amount plus 3% of the previous salary). This allowed
faculty with relatively high salaries to maintain that position after promotion, rather than simply
going to the minimum for the next rank.
It was recognized that these changes would create salary inversions. Therefore, it was
agreed that a Faculty Salary Inversion Review Committee would be formed to consider these and
recommend adjustments to the Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs. No guidelines
for the committee were provided. The committee recommended that salary of faculty whose
salaries were inverted by promotion of a colleague at the same rank and CUPA classification
should be brought up to that of the promoted colleague, plus $100 for each year in rank. This
resulted in salary adjustments for 12 faculty in five departments at a total cost of $20,864 to base
salaries. This contract was the first in many years in which minimum salaries for each rank
increased by a smaller percentage than the ATB percentage increase.
Inversions are Corrected - 2009
In the 2009 contract, the Salary Inversion Review Committee and its procedures were
defined in a memorandum of understanding attached to the contract. Salary inversions were
determined to occur when a newly promoted faculty member’s salary is greater than someone in
the same CUPA Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code who was previously at that
rank and the newly promoted faculty member does not have a justifiably high salary based on
market or achievement. Such unusually high-value hires who were exempt from triggering salary
inversions were to be identified at the time of hire. Faculty whose salaries were inverted based
on this definition would have their salary adjusted in an amount equal to the difference in salaries
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plus $100 for each year in rank up to five years. Minimum salaries at each rank again increased
at a smaller percentage than the ATB increase percentage.
Getting to Market - 2012
Two steps were taken in the 2012 contract to alleviate salary compression. First, procedures
for the Salary Inversion Review Committee were moved from an addendum to the 2009 contract
into the main body of the 2012 contract, providing the perception of a more permanent
component of the salary determination process. Second, market and seniority issues were
addressed with the dedication of 0.5% and 1.0%, respectively, of total faculty salary dedicated to
the effort. Target salaries for each faculty member were calculated as market salary for CIP code
and rank based on CUPA data at public institutions, plus a proportion of salary for fringe
benefits, plus 1% of salary for each year in rank capped at 20 years for full professors and five
years for all other ranks. Target salaries were multiplied by 1.25 for 12-month faculty and by 0.8
for those without a terminal degree. Salary adjustments based on these calculations were capped
at $4,000. Prior to these adjustments, salaries of 81 of 300 full-time faculty were under their
target, while only five were under target after adjustment. Minimum salaries at each rank again
increased at a smaller percentage than the ATB salary increase percentage.
Initial Hire Salary - 2015
The final component was negotiated in the 2015 contract. While annual and promotion
increases were almost entirely dependent on contract specifications that were applied to all
faculty equally, initial salaries were negotiated individually at the time of hire subject only to
salary minimums for each rank. These then had a huge effect on base salary and raises (usually a
percent of base salary) throughout a faculty member’s career. This difference was compounded
because the salary differential between faculty who started with salaries higher than their peers
gradually grew throughout a career. This problem is exacerbated because it is often suggested
that negotiation of initial salaries can be biased as a function of gender (Porter et al., 2008;
Freund et al., 2016). Specification of a formula for calculation of initial salary removes the
potential for such bias and creates a justification for salary differentials throughout the faculty, in
all disciplines and career stages. Initial salaries are determined by: contractually mandated salary
minimums if these are higher than any of the following: (a) if there is another faculty member
with the same CIP code and rank currently in the hiring department, initial salary will be the
current faculty member’s salary minus 1% for each year in rank; (b) average CUPA salary for
the CIP code and rank; (c) if there is no discipline and rank specific CUPA data, the most recent
CUPA average for “All Disciplines and All Institutions Combined” times the CUPA market
factor for the next highest rank.
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Conclusions
Our approach to correcting salary compression and preventing its recurrence has spanned
five contracts and 15 years. Initial salaries are now set in a transparent, objective, and justifiable
fashion that reflects market forces. This, in conjunction with the market and seniority
adjustments of 2006 and 2012 have effectively eliminated the possibility of gender biased
salaries. Nine years of increases in minimum salaries that were less than ATB increases or
inflation have created a situation in which few faculty are hired at minimum salaries or promoted
to minimum salaries. Furthermore, salary dispersion is maintained subsequent to promotion.
When anomalies arise (i.e., salary inversions), they are identified and corrected in a consistent
manner. Across the 11 years in which the Salary Inversion Review Committee has been active,
the average number of faculty who have had salary adjustments due to inversion has been 7.6 per
year and the dollar amount added to base salaries has averaged $15,007 per year.
Problems with effective function of the salary inversion committee at this point in the
evolution of our contract are that (a) inversions are triggered only by promotion, so that they can
exist for several years, or indefinitely at the rank of professor, without being detected; and (b)
inversions exist only within the same CIP code, the assignment of which falls under management
rights; hence, faculty are sometimes dissatisfied with their CIP code. A negative effect of this
approach has been that the salary structure is quite rigid. When college deans negotiate hiring
conditions, there is no room for salary negotiation; initial salaries are simply defined by the
contract. This can repel some candidates who expect to dicker and win. Similarly, if excellent
faculty are courted by other universities, matching external offers could trigger salary inversions.
This quandary could result in loss of some better faculty. Additionally, explicit acceptance of
salary differentials among faculty who do the same work but are in different disciplines could
create tension. However, this is something that faculty generally accept as necessary in order to
hire talented colleagues. None of these potential problems has seemed to become significant.
Overall, the cause of salary compression problems at NMU (large differences between rank
salary minimums and ATB salary adjustments that were equal to changes in rank minimums) and
their solutions (bringing faculty salaries to defined targets that take into account market and
seniority, annual correction of salary inversions, and defined initial salaries) have been unique.
Although there is widespread agreement in the literature that salaries should be positively
correlated with seniority, there is not agreement on the degree of salary dispersion that best
promotes university effectiveness. Dispersion of faculty salaries in higher education is influenced
by factors such as type of university, discipline, rank, collective bargaining, and year, so
regression analysis is generally accepted as the best method for detecting compression (though
we did not use this method at NMU). Additionally, regression can indicate the degree of
correction appropriate for individual faculty. But there is not agreement on what predictor
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variables make the best models, and this is likely to differ among universities and even
departments within a given university. Correction of salary compression takes money, but the
real challenge is changing the factors that cause compression so that the process does not need to
be repeated frequently. NMU’s approach to negate the systemic causes of compression was
gradual (over a 15 year period and five contracts) and strongly reliant on shared governance
throughout. It used market adjustments, consistent correction of salary inversions, and defined
initial salaries to create a transparent and justifiable salary structure that precludes the worst
forms of compression.
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